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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
This paper concerns itself with several approaches to a 
secular understanding of religious belief and deals briefly 
with the more or less explicit challenge they offer to the 
notion that there is in fact a God which communicates to man. 
This problem emerged for me as I encountered religious phe-
nomenology and structuralism for the first time this year, 
and noted the obvious challenge they pose to traditional 
dogma. The answer I offer is one I really had not set out to 
achieve: a tentative acceptance of the results of these pro-
grams in the light of the system of Teilhard, the heuristic 
wealth of whose ideas I also began to appreciate this year. 
My original intent led to a work which was about three 
times as long as the present one, but even less conclusive, 
and certainly less coordinated. I have reduced the paper 
to its present scope in an effort to do greater justice to 
the single area mentioned above, especially to concentrate 
upon the high god concept, several significant interpreta-
tions of religious expression by psychologists and socio-
logists, and the structural analysis of myth, and last to 
provide an exploratory venture toward an accommodation. 
There are no significant terms utilized in the text 
which require special definitions not provided when they are 
introduced. Most terms can be found in a good dictionary. 
A special distinction might be remembered in the penultimate 
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chapter: methodological materialism, physicalism, or natu-
ralism assumes that only what is material, physical, or natu-
ral can enter as data into an adequate scientific explana-
tion of a phenomenon; ontological, or metaphysical materi-
alism, physicalism, or naturalism assumes that only what is 
material, physical, or natural in fact obtains. 
Since this is not a graduate level paper, I have taken 
the option to place all citations after the body of the text. 
CHAPTER II 
THE APPREHENSION OF THE SUPREME BEING 
In the prefatory remarks to Structuralism and Christian- 
Gfinther Schiwy calls upon Christian intellectuals to 
meet the increasingly critical challenge Christianity faces 
from the new, competing world-views which claim a basis in 
empirical science. He of course notes the challenge of 
Marxism in its more recent and critical expressions. But 
above all he notes a challenge from "structuralism."' This 
rapidly rising movement originated in France, largely because 
of the theoretical efforts of Claude Levi-Strauss. Structur-
alism is interpreted in many ways. The Freudian Jacques 
Lacan uses it as a psychoanalytic tool. Jean Piaget regards 
it not so much a philosophy as a methodology somewhat akin to 
conventionalism in mathematics. But its major proponent, 
Levi-Strauss, uses it as an anthropological tool to discover 
the true or fundamental meaning of myth and religious lan-
guage. Herein, as one might expect, lies its greatest threat 
to Christianity. 
Of course, the general study of comparative religions 
has often troubled the minds of many Christians. We may re-
call that Rudolph Bultmann felt compelled to renounce all 
that he felt was not unique to Christianity because of it, 
and to center his thinking on the kerygma and the Law-Gospel 
dialectic. His shock is not unintelligible, for many aspects 
of the Christian faith are found more or less explicitly in 
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other faiths as well. It is profitable to enumerate some of 
these. 
Christians regularly pray to "Our Father who art in 
heaven." The supreme being as "primitives" have often under-
stood it is also celestial in nature. The Ewe tribesmen say 
that "'where the sky is, God is too.'"2 In these cases the 
high god is commonly titled with respect to his celestial 
status (the Selknamese high god Temaukel is called "The One 
Above" or "He Who Is in Heaven") or bears a name signifying 
the sky (the Chinese Tien, the Mongolian Tangri, the Indian 
Dyaus, Zeus, Ouranos, et al.). Mircea Eliade insists quite 
emphatically that a belief in a supreme celestial divinity is 
almost universal.3 One might object that the Christian con-
cept of heaven is somehow non-spatial in the common sense of 
the term. But Eliade stresses that the sky apprehension is 
a phenomenological one, creating a psychological state where-
by 
"Most High" becomes quite naturally an attribute of 
the divinity. The regions above man's reach, the 
starry places, are invested with the divine majesty 
of the transcendent, of absolute reality, of ever-
lastingness. Such places are the dwellings of the 
gods; certain privileged people go there as the re-
sult of rites effecting their ascension into heaven; 
• • • when a man ceremonially ascends the steps of 
a sanctuary [10, or the ritual ladderjeading to the 
sky he ceases to become a man . . . .4  
As one might expect, sky gods are thought to manifest 
themselves in or utilize sky phenomena. They speak their 
will through thunder (cf. John 12: 27-29), punish with light-
ning, storms, and disease (regarded by contemporary primitives 
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and Europeans even down through Luther's day, as sky-borne) 
as in the Book of Job, where Satan is God's agent and the 
theophany is a storm, or send life-giving light and rain. 
The sky suggests other attributes with which we are fa- 
miliar: according to the Nuer in Nilotic East Africa, the 
high god is ubiquitous and invisible, as is the air or wind.5  
Such is the case also with Puru, the high god of the Saliva 
of Colombia;6 and, especially among those divinities which 
are concerned with the moral order, this is considered corol-
lary to a more important attribute: omniscience. 
The breadth of the sky and its seeming all-pervasiveness 
combine with its clarity and luminosity to engender the feel-
ing that "somewhere out there" even one's innermost thoughts 
are being scrutinized.7 The aforementioned Nuer deity also 
sees and hears all. That which is regarded the best study of 
divine omniscience describes this attribute as 
. . . a visual omniscience . . . . according to 
the evidence it is mostly sky-gods and astral gods, 
or gods somehow connected with the heavenly realm 
of light, to whom omniscience is ascribed. . . .$ 
One may object that these references imply solar, lunar, or 
astral concepts of deity, unworthy of our concept of God as 
Lord over all the cosmos. While in some cases this is true, 
it is not always so simple. Very often (as in the Gospel and 
Epistles of St. John) the representation of God as luminous 
is an allegory for divine, spiritual light, the proper attri-
bute of God. For example, the Desana, a small Amazonian tribe, 
are worshippers of Page Abe ("Sun Father"), the primordial 
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creator-Father in heaven who is not to be in any direct way 
identified with the sun we behold; rather, the sun is simply 
his representative luminary, a symbol of the perfect light.9 
Most frequently, divine omniscience is spoken of in re-
lation to the bad actions of men. Nyalich, the supreme being 
of the Nilotic Dinka, sees murderers and robbers. The Chief 
Up Above of the Tsimshian Indians marks those who abuse ani-
mals. Sexual offenses are also common objects of divine note 
among virtually all tribes.10 
An obvious corollary of visual omniscience is universal 
hearing, a secondary amplification of seeing. Again Yahweh 
must share this phenomenon with many other supremacies, such 
as Temaukel, the Nuer deity, Ptah (Egypt), and the Mesopota-
mian Ea, called "Lord of the Ear."11 
Divine omniscience also often involves knowledge of 
thoughts. Temaukel, Zeus, Tien, the Arikaran Great Manitou, 
and the Kachin supreme deity Karai Kasang are among the many 
who "see what men think." Especially among Yahweh, Zeus, and 
Tien the intent of this intimate insight is primarily to safe-
guard oaths and covenants.12 
The power of the supreme deity's mentality is also typi-
cally related to assertions about the god's role as a creator. 
According to Van Der Leeuw, the usual supreme being creates 
"'by means of pure thought and will."13  
Van Der Leeuw is strikingly corroborated in the creation 
story of the Colombian Witoto. Moma ("Father") had no par-
ents, but came into being solely by power of the "Word." Yet 
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he himself personifies the Word. According to Eliade, 
Moma brought all that exists into being out of the 
"appearance" (naino) of a thing's "nonexisting sub-
stance." . . . In connection with his creative 
role, Moma refers to himself as Naimuema or "he who 
is or possesses what is not present (inexplicable, 
illusive)." In another myth, which complements the 
one above, it is related that Moma drew plants and 
animals out of his own body. [Konrad] Preuss was 
impressed by the remarkable similarity between 
Moma's creative activity by the "Word" and the pro-
logue to Saint John's Gospel, but he felt that 
there was no reason to suspect a Christian influence.14 
In connection with the "Word" concept, Eliade also notes 
that at times the Australian concept of the "alcheringa" (or 
in short form, "alchera"; a Kaitish term for the Edenic, or 
primal age) is seen as a kind of Philonian mediation princi-
ple. Everything which truly exists now, which is really real, 
is thought to have come into being during the primal era, a 
"dream-time" which abides in creation even today as a kind of 
nous or blueprint.15 
Although the sovereign god may often be represented as 
quite aloof from the everyday affairs of men, he as creator 
is typically considered the founder and guardian of the so-
cial, ritual, and moral milieu of the tribe, investing cus-
tom with an inviolable sacredness.16 Pettazzoni explains 
that the cosmos with its social order will stand as the god 
has created it, if it is not thrown off-balance. Moral 
transgression does just that, by subverting the social order 
and returning the tribe and its setting to primitive barbar-
ism and primordial chaos. Methods of divine punishment also 
involve temporary suspensions of cosmic order, such as light-
ning and storms, floods, and other cataclysms.17 
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"Fall" accounts are sometimes given as a reason for the 
introduction of distress or moral evil into the world and the 
subsequent alienation of the supreme being. Often among these 
the offense is somehow linked with a woman or women. For the 
Margi of Nigeria, a woman put out a dirty calabash, which in- 
fected the finger of one of the divine children, whereupon 
the high god withdrew in anger to a great distance.18 For 
the Kumai of Australia, some traitor revealed the mysteries 
of the bull-roarer (a highly revered ceremonial device said 
to be able to reproduce the voice of the high god) to the 
women, whereupon Mungan-ngaua, the supreme being, killed 
nearly all the human beings, and soon afterward ascended to 
the sky.19 
Certain native religions, especially among South American 
aborigines, also bear a distinct eschatological element. Dur-
ing an eclipse, the Brazilian Tupinamba pray to their other- 
wise largely ignored heavenly father Tamoi, 
to destroy the world. After the Portuguese 
intensified, and generated a long series of 
movements in which the Tupinamba sought out 
a paradise where there is neither death nor 
Apapocura-Guarani, the Arikena, the Saliva, 
also have remarkable eschatologies; and, of  
imploring him not 
conquest the fear 
milleniaristic 
the land of Tamoi, 
old age.20 The 
and the Yaruro 
course, those of 
various ancient European and Near-Eastern cultures are known 
well enough to permit a bare reference. 
However, in spite of the rather strong impression of 
deity one might receive from the aforementioned accounts, 
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celestial supreme deities by and large account for very 
little in the religious lives of those who acknowledge them. 
They tend to be regarded as quite passive, distant, and "re-
moved in space and time, a static immanence rather than an 
active presence."21 Such a divinity may be the cosmic crea-
tor and author of all life, but soon after this is accom-
plished he retires to a place or status at times even too in-
accessible for worship: he becomes a deus otiosus. He is 
also often concomitantly borne in the minds of the reflective 
to the available rational extremes of exaltation and given a 
status of metaphysical perfection and/or beatitude superior 
to that of any other agent or entity.22 Such is the God of 
Anseim and the Scholastic philosophers. Such, perhaps, is 
the source of skepticism. The tendency in our own culture 
during the present century affords a good example of supreme 
being receding into bare philosophical possibility. 
Paul Radin points out that the truly skeptical mentality 
is not unique to classical and modern Western culture, nor is 
it likely that it has not clearly appeared in any age. His 
particular researches concern primitive cultures and beliefs 
still accessible in remarkably pure form in the early part of 
the present century, and of the "out-and-out skeptics," he 
notes that "Every ethnologist has encountered them."23 After 
noting that African peoples are especially noted for their 
critical audacity, he cites a remarkable passage from Callaway's 
The Religious System of the Amazulu, in which a native asserts 
that nothing certain can be said about the Zulu creator god, 
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uNkulunkulu (since the initial u behaves like a shewa, this is 
actually the correct spelling). Even the chiefs, who are sup-
posed to be his earthly manifestations, only speak ignorantly 
and with bewildering ambiguity. He then adds that the god is 
said to have given all things, 
"But so far as I can see, there is no connection 
between his gift and the things we now possess. 
"I say then that there is not one amongst us who 
can say that he knows all about Unkulunkulu [sic]. 
For we say, 'Truly we know nothing but his name; 
but we no longer see his path which he made for us 
to walk in. All that remaips is mere thought about 
the things we like. . . ."24  
Edwin James presumes that the loss of theistic effica-
ciousness which results from divine recession explains why 
"in modern times such movements as Deism . . . were short-
lived and ineffective . . . while the cultus of the saints 
has never lacked its zealous votaries."25 This significant 
comment introduces the concept of the mediator, a demiurge or 
culture hero who provides the more or less vital link between 
the transcendent supreme being and mankind. The Shilluk of 
Nilotic East Africa provide an example which combines what we 
might call "Mosaic" and "Messianic" (as opposed to more spe-
cifically "Christie") elements. In the alchera, the supreme 
being Juok shared his great house above the clouds with all 
humanity. But then the people ate of a certain fruit which 
made them sick, so Juok sent them away.26 Because of his now 
almost impenetrable transcendence, he barely figures into the 
religious consciousness of the Shilluk people. But Juok saw 
humanity's plight and sent to them a demiurge, Nyikang. He 
gathered a people (the Shilluk, of course) and became their 
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first king. He then led them to the land they now occupy 
along the White Nile, brought greatness upon them, gave them 
their laws and customs, divided their land into districts, 
and sent rain upon it. He disappeared during a storm, but 
occasionally reappears in animal form; and his spirit abides 
in the reigning monarch. Whenever great need, sickness, or 
death occurs, he is called upon to intercede with Juok on be-
half of his people.27 
Although it cannot be easily understood without an under-
standing of the concept of totemism and the primitive notion 
of evil, another remarkable example is to be found in the 
Winnebago Hare Cycle. Hare is a demiurgic, totemic being who 
appears either in the form of a hare or, at times, in a far 
larger and more vague animal form. There is something of the 
element of a trickster about him (he is sometimes mischevious, 
sometimes the "fall-guy" for another being's plot), but his 
cosmological and soteriological characteristics are worthy of 
some note. 
Within what appears to be a concept of a four-tiered 
universe, Hare is presently the divine ruler of the world in 
which we live. Earthmaker, the supreme deity, and Hare's 
grandfather, is the creator and general overseer of all of 
the worlds as well as the specific ruler of the high heaven. 
Wakdjunkaga, the primary Winnebago trickster figure (and also 
a beneficiary of mankind during the alchera), rules one of 
the realms of the dead. Third comes the earth, and the under-
world is ruled by a demonic figure called "Bladder."2B Hare 
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first appeared in this world during the alchera, when he was 
born of a young woman who"had not had sexual intercourse with 
anyone." As he grew up he began a career of destroying or 
neutralizing the evil beings which threatened humanity, and 
of providing humanity with some of the more important elements 
of Winnebago culture. In the course of his wanderings he 
found that a powerful demon, Chief Sharp-Elbow, had killed a 
friend of his. Upon killing Sharp-Elbow, he raised his com-
rade from death. Later, he killed and burned some particu-
larly ferocious demons, tossed their remains into a stream 
where they became harmless fish, and said (in a passage sug-
gestive of Genesis 3: 15), "'You tried to abuse people. From 
now on the people will call you fast-fish and when they step 
into the water you will nibble at their ankles.'"29  
Even more striking is the succeeding episode in which 
Hare himself was killed by a monstrous ant. However, he was 
resurrected by the goddess Grandmother Earth, whereupon, by 
ruse, he in turn killed the ant. The ant's body then turned 
into the ants of common knowledge. "You were trying to ab-
use human beings,'" Hare exclaimed in another passage oddly 
suggestive of Genesis 3: 15, ':'and, for that reason, you will 
henceforth remain down there close to the earth and the people 
will tramp on you."3°  
Finally Hare finished his destructive work and provided 
food animals for humanity (not by creating them, but by asking 
for volunteers and bathing those which did so in fat). He 
also secured the horse as mankind's primary work animal. This 
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having been accomplished, all that now stands in the way of 
eternal life for man on earth is the smallness of the earth 
itself (should men not die, they would quickly crowd eacliother 
and bring upon themselves great suffering), and the fact that 
one day the earth will itself come to an end.31  
As a rule, it is only when a culture disintegrates that 
people gain the courage to examine anew the religious and 
philosophical foundations upon which it is based. Conse-
quently, the changes which occur often highlight some basic 
archetypes of religious consciousness. In recent years there 
has occurred a remarkable example of the supplanting of a re-
ceding supreme deity by a vigorous mediator figure which, al-
though consciously patterned after the life of Jesus, may a 
fortiori provide us with an interesting suggestion of one of 
the possible dynamics which played a major role in the minds 
of the members of the Christian church of the first century. 
Isaiah Shembe was the founder of the South African 
Church of the Nazarites. After a brief career as an ill-
trained Baptist preacher, he broke away to form his own fol-
lowing in 1911, with the primary goal of revitalizing the 
moribund Zulu tradition. Convinced by personal revelations 
of his unique supernatural status, he plunged into a peri-
patetic ministry involving much faith healing and exorcism. 
He gradually usurped the position of iNkosi epheZulu, the ab-
stract supreme deity now bereft of practically all cultic 
significance. He did so by adopting the divine titles 
uMvelingqangi ("He Who Was before Me"; cf. John 8: 58, "Before 
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Abraham was, I am.") and uNkulunkulu ("the Great-Great-One"), 
and preaching that while the Zulus were once taught of a god 
who could not see and had neither love nor pity for men, 
Shembe revealed in himself a god "'who walks on feet and 
heals with his hands, and who can be known by men, a God who 
loves and who has compassion.'" In short, he "brought the 
distant God into their midst." The "Black Christ" died in 
1935; but he had maintained that although he might die one 
day, his essence would live on in his progeny. G. C. 
Oosthuizen establishes at length that the deification of 
Shembe can by no means be simply classified as one of many 
native Black reactions to 
the so-called pale white Christ of the white man . . 
but it is an effort to have through him powerful con-
tact with a world the Zulus fear they may lose-as:la 
result of the disruption of their society . . . . an 
intimate relationship with the supernatural world, 
which was such a real experience through the king 
before the white man came. J2  
Shembe's followers now claim that he rose again four years 
after his death.33  
It would appear, then, that the typical approach to the 
anthropology of religion has established fairly well that 
there are certain recurrent themes in the fabric of religion 
throughout the world. We may argue that, while all of the 
other religions collectively duplicate the tenets of the 
Christian religion, none appear to contain all of its elements 
in its unique formulatory modes. Excessive reliance on this 
argument can become dangerously similar to that of the horse-
man who contended that his favorite horse must be the sole 
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member of an unique genetic variety of horse simply because no 
other horse was identical to his favorite; but it does perhaps 
allow us some of the benefit of the old Enlightenment argument 
that Christianity is the apex and consummation of all reli-
gious ideals and aspirations, to which we might add in faith 
that ours is that true religious expression to which God has 
been leading all men. 
Others may object that the archetypal theory which ex-
presses most of the data of religious ethnology is yet un-
proven. Indeed, it is not so. much a fact that analysts doubt 
the existence of some relatively invariant psychic apparatus 
which generates, over the long run, a relatively uniform pat-
tern of religious apprehension; it is just that no one as yet 
has devised an adequate scientific criterion for verifying and 
explicating its existence. Especially if humanity does con-
stitute a single species, and if (as continued research seems 
to indicate) Homo sapiens has been prone to religious expres-
sion from the beginning, then it is conceivable to argue that 
all religions stem from the primordial faith of the first hu-
man community. This is at least as plausible as arguing that 
mankind as a species (or a genetically close cluster of spe-
cies) emerged in several isolated settings at approximately 
the same time, a view held by some scientists which may serve 
to bolster the argument that religious behavior is an emergent 
natural property. However, the fact that a single-community 
theorist can consistently maintain the naturalistic position 
and ask whether the beliefs of the primal community might not 
16 
also be explained organically without the necessity of appeals 
for Divine guidance at a crucial juncture tends to vitiate 
such as the old Bible Storybook argument that those who are not 
now Christians have, via their ancestors or themselves, strayed 
from the faith already revealed to Adam and Eve. 
CHATTER III 
RELIGION WITHIN THE BOUNDS OF LIBIDO ALONE 
Granted that a final verdict may not, from our vantage, 
be possible until all the major problems attending to the 
concept of human evolution are settled, many still believe 
that other approaches may render the discussion trivial and 
the possibility of genuine revelation nothing more than a 
debater's point. 
Sigmund Freud illustrates one approach which seeks to 
explain religion in terms of a psychoanalytic approach. He 
regards religion as a form of neurotic behavior. Within this 
context he attempts to construct religion from concepts of 
the father-image and Oedipal guilt. Concerning the former, 
he notes first that the task of civilization is principally 
to defend its constituent people against the destructive 
forces of nature, which even in the face of the highest civi-
lizations as yet remains unvanquished, still inflicting 
wounds under the name of fate. But in order to accomplish 
its task every civilization must impose some amount of priva-
tion on its inherents. Injured thereby in his self-regard, 
yet afraid of nature, and curious in addition, man demands an 
explanation. He gains this by humanizing nature, providing 
himself with a new avenue of reaction. His prototype within 
his memory which proves roughly analogous to the situation in 
which he finds himself is that of his parents during his early 
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childhood, especially his father. He had reason to fear his 
father, yet he was sure of his father's protection. Thus he 
projects upon the forces of nature a father-character, turn-
ing these forces into gods. As with the father of the help-
less child, the gods must turn aside the terrors of nature, 
reconcile men to fate, and establish a system of morality. 
When it becomes apparent that his belief and correlated ritu-
al do not solve all of his problems, he (if particularly in-
telligent) begins anew to autonomize nature, place the gods 
themselves under the rule of fate, and apportion to them as 
their proper domain the maintenance of the moral order. Grad-
ually all divinities are condensed into one monotheistic 
father-image on whom all men focus with the intensity of a 
child's relation to his father. From thence man derives 
claims of favoredness and divine election.' 
Anthropologists object on two accounts: Freud does not 
account for the extensive worship or the likely historical 
priority of the figure of the supreme goddess. One might 
posit them tentatively as projections of the mother-image in 
matrilinear societies, but even Freud confesses that in view 
of his following concept he cannot account for them.2 In 
addition, Freud seems completely unaware that the dominant 
human tendency is to ignore, to be unable to relate to, the 
supreme being, and to let him recede into transcendent obscu-
rity in favor of lesser but more vivid and personal religious 
objects, such as in the later Canaanitic emphasis of the storm 
god Baal over the supreme being, El. 
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But apart from these criticisms, what would prompt a man 
to adhere to Freud's concept of the God-Father? Prior to civ-
ilization, men led lives which, according to Thomas Hobbes, 
were "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short." Not only was 
nature deadly, but men also killed eachSther for the sake of 
anger, convenience or greed, and were just as readily killed 
for the sake of revenge or greed. To escape this cycle, soci-
eties were formed upon the rule, "Thou shalt not kill." Thus 
now, except for a few isolated areas where feuding persists, 
only nations behave in such a selfish or retributive manner. 
But to publish such a rational explanation for the murder pro-
hibition would be to relativize it and deal a serious blow to 
the authority behind it. Thus we do not acknowledge that it 
is the work of men, but assert that such is the will of God. 
In this manner all laws are justified. 
Thus far, Freud admits that he has made only a rational, 
and not an actual reconstruction, based on just one law. But 
religion is a neurosis (and, to Freud, a collective one at 
that); and the trauma which we must seek to explain this as-
pect of it is discovered in totemism: under the totemic sys-
tem, Thou shalt not kill is a sanction which, according to 
Freud, was restricted to the protection of the father-
substitute, and then gradually extended to others. The primal 
father was the original image of God. Under primordial social 
conditions in which a father kept a harem of all the women in 
the household, competition for the women was blocked for the 
younger men by the Pater familias. Incidentally, this condi-
tion is today at least formally observed by two or three ab-
original societies on the island of Borneo, and is apparently 
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the common circumstance among the higher primate species. 
Therefore, the younger men were forced either to abstain (un-
likely), or perhaps to possess the women on the sly (as do the 
young men of the Mundugumor in Borneo), or to drive the father 
from his position of control. The problem is that sometimes 
when the last course is taken the father is killed in the pro-
cess. 
Now Freud asserts that religion involves not only wish 
fulfilment, but important historical recollections as well. 
Further, a human child cannot successfully complete his de-
velopment without passing through a neurotic phase in which 
he is motivated by anxiety (usually involving fear of punish-
ment) to tame his instincts by acts of repression. In just 
the same way, Freud theorizes, collective humanity in the pro-
cess of civilization passes through analogous collective neu-
roses. Religion, "the universal obsessional neurosis of hu-
manity," also arose out of the Oedipus complex, the dominant 
neurosis of the developing child. This collective version of 
the complex originates in the (somehow) recalled image of the 
primordial patricide. "For men knew that they had disposed of 
their father by violence, and in their reaction to that impious 
deed, they determined to respect his will thenceforward." 
Pater plus patricidal guilt, raised from the existential to 
the universal, sums up Freud's concept of religion.36 Freud 
follows in the wake of Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau as one of 
the more recent of a long line of social contract theorists; 
but his concept of the dreaded father slain, then wistfully 
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recalled at large is the first major psychoanalytic attempt 
to describe the mechanism upon which the contract is based. 
Of course, it is open to criticism. His patriarchal 
concept of society, as well as his distinct inability to con-
ceive of a distinct psychology of womanhood, prevented him 
from developing a concomitant social Electra complex or what-
ever else would be needed to explain the rise of religion in 
matriarchies and in the consciousness of women. Secondly, 
anthropologists generally reject his Oedipal view on the ra-
ther conclusive grounds that there is no evidence to support 
the concept of a recalled primal father-slaying. Thirdly, a 
psychoanalytic approach to the social origins of religion de-
pends on the use of concepts and theories which are themselves 
at best vague, needful of precise and testable explication, 
and by no means universally accepted. As Levi-Strauss put it, 
"'what is refractory to explanation can ipso facto not serve 
as explanation."4  
Followers of Freud's notable and independently-thinking 
disciple, Carl Gustav Jung, have developed another basic ex-
planation which, if refined carefully, have broader explana-
tory powers. For a Jungian the alchera represents a person 
in the womb, in a perfect incestuous union with the mother. 
The Fall constitutes expulsion from the womb, progressive 
divorcement from the blissful original condition, and a con-
frontation with the incest taboo. A person's sexual desire 
progresses outward socially in time, from the opposite parent 
as its object, to the opposite siblings, to opposite cousins, 
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et cetera, to completely unrelated potential sexual partners. 
The problem, then, especially in small societies, is to set an 
inner limit to endogamy. This is the overt function of the 
incest taboo. It structures society upon marriages of persons 
sufficiently unrelated to guarantee the constructive exchange 
of information and experience, and yet allows the marriage of 
persons sufficiently related to maintain social order and co-
operation. The incest taboo also functions covertly, by 
causing a person to sublimate (not to repress or outgrow, as 
in Freudianism) the unsatisfied incestuous desires into ad-
herence to a postulated system of spiritual entities and val-
ues, culminating in the essentially incestuous union with the 
divine cosmic parent (hence, for 
Mother Church, the church as the 
tical and sacramental union with 
clerical celibacy and the erotic 
Again, an obvious male bias  
example, such concepts as 
Bride of Christ, or the mys-
God; and such phenomena as 
sermons of St. Bernard).5 
in the, development of this 
theory compels doubts about its accuracy, although it seems 
more amenable to the inclusion of the feminine psyche than 
does that of Freud. Obvious as well is the applicability of 
the criticism that such a theory, like that of Freud, is too 
undefined, uncorroborable, and narrowly shared to be likely 
to provide an adequate explanation for the social origins of 
religion. However, the Jungian approach here given is at 
least apparently more compatible with the evidence anthropol-
ogists provide; and one might say that, although "refractory 
to explanation," it is possibly somewhat less so than the 
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phenomenon it seeks to explain, so that the phenomenon may at 
least be divisible into several narrower and therefore more 
comprehensively analyzable complices. Even then, however, 
the resultant complices could be assumed to be so broad that 
they are rendered superfluous by means of more detailed in-
dependent researches. For example, the social implications 
of religion have been investigated also by Durkheim and his 
followers. The logical structure of religious mythology is 
being independently analyzed by certain structuralists. What 
is crucial, and unproven about both the Freudian and Jungian 
approaches, is the discovery of the way in which religion as 
a social phenomenon interacts with religion as a personal 
experience. But the psychoanalytic approaches have been 
heuristically fruitful enough to suggest that religious con-
sciousness is in principle naturalistically analyzable. 
CHAPTER IV 
THE SOCIAL ORDER WITHIN 
With respect to the sociological analysis of religion, 
the approach of Emile Durkheim has been the best known and 
most profitable. We shall specifically consider an even 
more portentious development upon the foundations Durkheim 
set down. Noting that beliefs must have definite proximate 
causes (they cannot persist in themselves and therefore must 
correspond to the believers' current experiences if they are 
to survive) and that one cannot know whether particular be-
liefs are generated by the same causes as identical beliefs 
were previously,1 Guy Swanson sought to establish a theory 
which would embrace adequately any religion and its setting. 
Durkheim previously theorized that the sacred is funda-
mentally notable for its dissociation from utility, that there 
is no common intrinsic quality of things regarded sacred which 
can account for such respectful regard, that sacredness must 
therefore be regarded extrinsic to any object considered so, 
that in this event the attitude of respect for sacred things 
is basically identical with that of respect for moral author-
ity, that a religious object must therefore be worthy of moral 
respect, and finally that society must therefore be the real 
object of religious veneration.2 
Noting critically that Durkheim failed to explain how 
spirits come to be considered unified and personified beings, 
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that he did not explain how some gods which represent massive 
natural forces can also represent a society which cannot con-
trol these forces, and that he failed to consider that not all 
supernatural forces are venerated (what about demons, for ex-
ample?),3 Swanson concluded that the origin of spirit concepts 
is in social relationships persisting across generations, that 
a spirit gains its identity in relation to a particular and 
organized social entity, and that where several spirits influ-
ence a given setting they are usually assigned purposes and 
significance as a function of their relationship to a specific 
social level.4 
To test his theory, he selected fifty typical ancient or 
primitive religious cultures, categorized their beliefs, and 
analyzed their concomitant societies on the basis of "Sover-
eignty Levels." Swanson considers an established type of 
social organization to have sovereignty to the extent that it 
has original and independent juridical authority over some 
sphere of life. In other words, its power to make decisions 
in this sphere is not delegated from without, and cannot 
legitimately be usurped in its exercise of this power by 
another group. Thus, roughly speaking, families, villages, 
tribes, cities, states, and nations are sovereign organiza-
tions, while the guilds, professions, armies, educational in-
stitutions, et cetera which serve them and receive their 
authority from them are "non-sovereign groups."5  
Among other phenomena, he analyzed the relation between 
belief in high gods and the levels of social organization. 
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Since the concept of high gods varies so greatly and never 
reaches a point of absolute monotheism (there always seem to 
be at least some angels, devils, and saints about), he ad-
mitted as his sole necessary criterion a specification of a 
god as the first cause of all subsequent events and the nec-
essary and sufficient condition for the continued existence 
of reality.6 
He discovered a definite positive correlation between 
belief in a high god and the presence of at least three types 
of sovereign social groups arranged in a hierarchy, such as 
kingdom, village, nuclear family. Were the king to personally 
administer to every village under his charge, the social struc-
ture of the kingdom would quickly break down, as it would lo-
cally were the village head to administer every family in his 
village. Of the nineteen societies having fewer than three 
types of sovereign groups, seventeen were found not to have 
causal monotheism (a high god). Of the twenty which were 
found to have three or more types, seventeen were found to 
possess a high god. The probability of such a great disparity 
occurring by chance was found to be less than .0005.7  
Eleven societies were omitted due to inconclusive data 
about the nature of their ranking deity.8 
Finally, Swanson discovered that high gods are much 
less likely to be otiose in societies which embody clearly 
the complex purposes these gods represent in purposive, com-
munal, non-sovereign organizations serving the needs of the 
sovereign groups.9 In other words, whereas high gods are 
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very much apt to occur in societies complex in sovereignty 
structures, the deity is likely to be otiose in societies 
affording few organized, non-sovereign communal services 
(educational and medical institutions, the military, etc.). 
This data seems to be borne out in at least two remarkable 
observations. Eliade notes that "As a creator, knowing and 
seeing all, guardian of the law [I], the sky god is ruler of 
the cosmos: he does not, however, rule directly, but wherever 
there are political bodies, he rules by his earthly represen-
tatives. . . ." Supportively, he cites a letter sent by Mangu-
Khan to the king of France: "'Such is the order of the eter-
nal God: In heaven there is only one eternal God and there is 
to be only one master on earth, Genghis-Khan, son of God!,,10  
Second, although he disagrees, Charles Long cites Robin Horton 
as believing "that the worship of the high god is related to 
size of the population and its active contact with the wider 
world. He states, 'We know that, in general, the lesser gods 
provide an interpretation of the special features of the micro-
cosm formed by a limited population maintaining intensive soc-
ial integration within a limited territorial area, whilst the 
high god provides an interpretation of the world seen as a 
whole."11 A society reaching out is complex sovereignly and 
communally. It would be interesting to apply Swanson's meth-
ods and conclusions to some of the cultures treated herein as 
well as to religious belief patterns in modern societies. 
How, for example, could he explain skepticism if religious 
speculation increases (supposedly) as the society proliferates? 
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Some criticize such a sociological theory for not con-
sidering the moral creativity of the prophetic personality, 
which innovates beyond the established ethical code and urges 
others on to new and broader moral claims upon their lives. 
Granted that prophets do go beyond a mere yea-saying to the 
status QUO, 
 but they also innovate within a social context. 
Prophecy generally appears in times of crisis with claims 
higher and broader than the existing social claims, since the 
former are the only ones which can restore order to the re-
spective particular situations. Further restriction can cer-
tainly not be seen as evidence against Durkheimian views. 
Also, the putative object and source of the prophet's dicta 
is generally supposed to be the same for those to whom he pro-
claims. But then, one might object, how does the sociologist 
explain tendencies toward proselytism and universalism? This 
is probably adequately explained by the observation that such 
phenomena are only very rarely observed in faiths limited to 
individual societies, but increase as religions spread beyond 
them into other societies and polities as well. Further, in 
aboriginal areas where religions do not greatly vary from 
society to society and the importance of faith is somewhat 
secondary to ceremony, proselytism is contingent only upon 
moving from one society to another; and the spiritual well-
being or brotherhood of those of one society generally does 
not even enter into the considerations of those of another. 
Finally, the argument that such a sociological theory cannot 
adequately explain the socially detaching power of conscience 
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which is often demonstrated by people who responsibly dissent 
from overwhelming opinions. To an extent one could import 
the answer above to the charge concerning prophecy; or, he 
may also be a skeptic who so objects, and therefore relatively 
free from the socializing influence of religion. However, the 
question raised at the bottom of page twenty-seven suggests 
that such a response might play into the hands of the objector. 
But Swanson could add that religion generally socializes by 
instilling more general ideals for a social order rather than 
by attempting to apologize for a particular administration per 
se. When he who criticizes is finally heard, his message is 
usually that the particulars of his society are not congruent 
to the principles to which the society appeals as its moral 
raison d'etre. 
It must be remembered, however, that the religious per-
son, as any person, is both a psychic and a social being. 
Therefore, an adequate explanation of religious phenomena 
will likely have to involve elements of psychological and 
sociological explanation. 
CHAPTER V 
ON WHETHER THE MEDIUM IS THE MESSAGE 
We may, of course, welcome the analyses of psychology 
and sociology for providing us with a collection of possible 
natural categories or avenues through which we may believe 
God to communicate his revelation to man. After all, Scripture 
abounds with social and psychological images and illustra-
tions. But the initially mentioned structural analysis of 
myth poses a new threat, this time to the exegete: since all 
myths have the same form and purpose, their meanings can be 
established independently of and as well as (if not better 
than) they might be with the agency of functional or historico-
critical parochialisms. 
According to the structuralist approach, the myths of the 
Bible can no longer be regarded as safely isolated within a 
Judaeo-Christian or even a broader Semitic-Aryan tradition. 
This again is based on the strongly supported view that the 
religious phenomenology of all human groups is universally 
similar. According to Adolf Jensen, the outstanding mythic 
figures, "appearing in different myths under different names, 
are so similar from one people to another that one cannot help 
but regard them as mere variations on a single theme."1  
The structuralist attempt to formalize the study of 
mythology may succeed in forming a usable criterion to demon-
strate the conceptual unity of all myths of given kinds; but 
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it must be admitted that the overall methodology is, at the 
present stage, extremely involved and difficult. Proceeding 
upward on the complexity scale from a given kind of myth (in 
respective specific forms) to the overarching hypothesis 
would roughly cover the following course: for each specific 
myth of a given collection (for example, all creation myths), 
one must first divide it into its smallest complete units of 
activity or state. Levi-Strauss speaks of the smallest "sen-
tences," although recent advances in structural linguistics 
necessitate a clarification, especially since no one now seems 
sure of what a sentence actually is. Most theorists conclude 
today that the structural function of any given myth is to re-
solve a conflict or apparent conceptual antinomy in the mind 
of its believer. On this point Levi-Strauss insists that the 
logic of mythical thought is not dissimilar to, nor is it any 
less rigorous than the logic of scientific thinking: the only 
really important difference lies in the nature of the material 
to which it is applied.2 Therefore, the analyst must now 
group the units he has derived into categories of opposition. 
For our purposes let us say that we operate with the binary 
opposition "things must live or things must not live." Levi-
Strauss and Edmund Leach consider this the basic conflict 
which religion tries to resolve; but how? 
Resolution must come through mediation. This may be done 
directly (such as, perhaps, "there are some things which seem 
neither alive nor dead exactly, such as trees and plants. They 
are neither dead like the rocks, nor do they move about like 
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the animals. Thus they suggest a broader reality). But if 
the direct approach proves intellectually unsatisfactory, the 
problem may be attacked indirectly by the application of an 
apparently naturally mediated conflict as an analogue or cov-
ering model. The Pueblo Indians attempt this with a three-
fold distinction of agriculture (the means to life), war (the 
means to death), and hunting (the means to life for men, but 
the means to death for animals). This is significant when 
we realize that for aboriginal peoples each animal (especially 
if a member of an untamed species) is patterned after, and 
therefore participates in the reality of its divine, primor-
dial form. For example, a divine buffalo would be said to 
participate in the deaths of any real buffaloes by reference 
to some alcheral myth wherein the divine buffalo renounces his 
life for the sake of the primal man or subsequent humanity. 
Such is the dynamic in the Hare Cycle, when the various crea-
tures which volunteer to be food for mankind take baths in fat, 
thereby establishing the destiny of the concrete individuals 
of their kind forever. Divine sacrifice brings human life; 
therefore it is not without reason that the Pueblo focus their 
primary cultic activities upon hunting. 
This covering process may continue indefinitely, with the" 
next major development being the importation of a value calcu-
lus. Now the analyst must gather all the data from all the 
myths in the class with which he is dealing into a large, mul-
tidimensional permutatiOn group and abstract for that class. 
After this he must finally correlate the classes. He may 
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derive a cognitive significance for any level of his ana- 
lytical process, but as he rises higher in the process the de- 
rived content is increasingly generalized until he can at last 
abstract a representative formula for the analysis of myth. 
Nothing short of a data processing laboratory will be satis- 
factory in handling the entire process, but Levi-Strauss be-
lieves that the fundamental analytical instrument for all 
mythology will correspond to a formula of the following type: 
fx(a) : fy(b) fx(b) : fa-1y 
where, given two terms (a and b) as well as the functions of 
the terms (fx and fy), a relation of equivalence is asserted 
between two situations when the terms and relations are in-
verted, under the following conditions: 1. one term must be 
replaced by its contrary, and 2. an inversion must be made 
between the function and the term value of the two elements. 
The ability to derive such a formula would be highly signif-
icant in view of Freud's assertion (general opinion to the 
contrary notwithstanding) that it takes two conflicting trau-
mas to produce a neurosis. This would mean that one could 
generate sociological and psychological correlatives of this 
hypothesis and perhaps be able to subject it to verification 
under laboratory conditions.3 
Edmund Leach has attempted to illustrate the structural 
hypothesis on a limited scale by an analysis of the Biblical 
creation accounts in his widely noted essay "Genesis as Myth."4 
At the outset he postulates that there are two basic anti-
nomies functioning: the contingency problem (life/non-life) 
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and the sociological problem (we/they, defining the social 
structure of Israel on the basis of allowed sexual relation-
ships: externally, by the limits of exogamy; internally, by 
the limits of incest). He acknowledges that it may be possi-
ble to use other criteria (indeed, he himself depends heavily 
upon standard psychoanalytical conceptions); but he accepts 
the structural hypothesis as the most universal, adding in 
effect that early attempts at data differentiation in a new 
science often appear to beg the question. A summary of his 
analysis follows. 
The first of three major segments centers about the crea-
tion days of Genesis 1. On the first day (1: 1-5) heaven and 
earth are distinguished, as are light from darkness, day from 
night, and evening from morning. On the second day (1: 6-8) 
the waters are separated, the water of fertility (rain) being 
placed above the earth, and infertile (sea) water being kept 
below. The waters are mediated by the firmament. On the third 
day (1: 9-10) the wet sea is divided from the dry land, and the 
two are mediated by vegetation, which lives off the land, but 
needs water. Vegetation is sexually neutral, its seed being 
in itself (1: 11-12), in contrast with the clear bisexuality 
of animal life. With this day, creation as a static or dead 
entity is complete. To this is opposed the dynamic or living 
aspect, beginning on the fourth day (1: 14-18). Mobile celes-
tial bodies are placed in the firmament, so that now light 
and darkness (as will life and death) become alternates. On 
the fifth day (1: 20-22) the seagoing fish are opposedly made 
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with respect to the birds which fly above the earth; but as 
life these forms also mediate the fertile and infertile 
waters, with the birds mediating the sky and the earth as well. 
On the sixth day God first creates the cattle, beasts, and 
creeping things (1: 24f) in opposition to the grasses, cereals, 
and fruit trees of the third day; but the allocation is not 
direct, for only the grasses go to the animals (1: 29f). The 
rest, including flesh not from anomalous beasts (such chaotic 
creatures ati water oreatures without fins or animals and birds 
that eat flesh) can be eaten by man (1: 29f). Finally, man 
and woman are created simultaneously (1: 26f). 
The second major segment again introduces the creation of 
the heaven-and-earth opposition, the static earth being medi-
ated to the dynamic heaven by a fertilizing mist drawn from 
the earth, thus blurring the distinction between life and non-
life (2: 4-6). Living Adam is then formed from the dead ground 
as an indigenous, infertile being (2: 7). The animals are also 
thus formed (2: 19). But the garden is fertilized by a river 
flowing out of Eden, the fertile east; hence again the river 
bears life to death (2: 9f). The infertile plants are also 
produced, but so is the tree of life and the tree of the know-
ledge of good and evil. Parenthetically, since structuralists 
ideally prefer to deal collectively with all the elements of 
all recensions of a myth, it is perhaps not out of order to 
note that the parallel account in the pseudepigraph of Jubilees 
reinforces Leach's interpretation of Adam and the garden as 
infertile with the assertion (3: 15) that Adam first spent 
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seven years in the garden guarding it and protecting it from 
the (fertile) birds and beasts and cattle.5 Fertile Eve is 
then formed from a rib of infertile Adam (Genesis 2: 22f). 
Now, according to Leach, the tree of the knowledge of good 
and evil is really also the tree of death, standing in op-
position to the tree of life; but it is also the tree of the 
knowledge of sexual difference. The diversity outside the 
garden is exemplified by the division of the Edenic river 
and the diversity of the animal life (cattle, birds, and 
beasts). Inside the garden things are unitary and self-
sustaining. Life exists eternally by itself. But Adam is 
lonely and needs a partner. The animals won't do since they 
are of a different kind; therefore Eve, of Adam's own sub-
stance, mediates the difference between man and animal. 
Finally the serpent emerges in chapter three. It is an ano-
malous entity of phallic significance which induces Adam and 
Eve to eat of the tree of sexual difference, thus making death 
inevitable. It is not dissimilar to the Sphinx in the Oedipus 
myth, which is the permissive key to Oedipus' act of incest. 
Adam and Eve are expelled from the eternal garden of static 
being into the diverse, fertile world; and for the first time 
pregnancy and reproduction are available to man (4: 1). 
In the final major segment the Cain and Abel account is 
plunged into a metamorphosis of sexual allegory and emerges as 
as an account of how God now prefers the fertile to the infer-
tile. From the remainder of Genesis a value system is derived 
which supports Israel's right to an exclusive existence apart 
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from other, worse peoples. Finally, Leach adds a few more 
thoughts about the curse of the serpent (Genesis 3: 15): 
the enmity is to be between the serpent's seed (which he re-
gards as semen, symbolic of sexuality and diversity) and that 
of the woman (her male child). He will bruise the serpent's 
head (Leach feels that this might be a charter for circum-
cision), but the serpent will bruise his heel. Since lameness, 
staggering, or foot impairments are a common characteristic of 
the heroes of autochthony myths (Oedipus, for example, means 
"Swollen-footed"), the right of Israel to exclusion is set 
down. We might again parenthetically note that in Jubilees 
3: 31 the (exclusive, self-contained) Jews are admonished not 
to uncover their bodies as do the Gentiles, who in so doing 
imitate the (fertile, diverse) animals. 
The pseudepigraphal Book of the Life of Adam and Eve in-
cludes some other interesting contributions to the complexion 
of the account. In chapter fifteen Eve states that she had been 
given dominion of the female creatures in the west and south, 
while Adam had been given control of the male creatures in the 
east and north. To bring about the fall, the devil sought out 
Adam's creatures, finally approaching our aforementioned phal-
lic symbol. Further, it is not the fruit of the tree itself 
which effects the fall; rather, the devil, within the serpent, 
pours out over the fruit "the poison of his wickedness, which 
is lust, the root and beginning of every sin" (19: 3). Then, 
as soon as Eve eats the fruit she is aware of her nakedness, 
and all the leaves of all the trees in the west and the south 
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(save for the fig) fall to the ground (20: 4). This is the 
close of the aichera and the end of its concomitant (if 
sterile) eternity. 
Virtually all primitive societies have roughly similar 
concepts of a primal time quite different from the present 
age. During this time, intermediate divinities shape all 
familiar objects, often out of amorphous or monstrous hulks 
of stuff.6 According to Jensen,7 these intermediate forming 
beings disappear at the close of the alchera (whatever happened 
to the serpent?), mortality replaces immortality, the ability 
to propagate comes about, and there emerges some vague concept 
of continued existence after the end of life (note Abel's 
blood, Genesis 4: 10). The primordial time ends with a fall 
account, occasioned either by a killing or the onset of sexu-
ality (always closely linked with mortality).8  
In the case of the primal myth of the South American 
Desana, the high god himself causes the fall, by committing 
incest with his daughter. As a result she dies, and creation 
is thrown into disarray. Her father resurrects her by fumi-
gating her with tobacco smoke, and restores order to the crea-
tion by proclaiming the first social law: the incest prohi-
bition.9  
We must note again that the difference between the two 
ages is a difference in order, from an eternal, perfect, 
Parmenidean oneness to a temporal, mortal, imperfect, Hera-
cleitean flux; from Plato's realm of being to his realm of 
becoming. And, according to many religious cultures, the 
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Parmenidean aspect never completely departs, but in some way 
"hangs over" the Heracleitean aspect like an informing logos, 
and can even be partly actualized again by cultic ritual.10  
Again, it is during the alchera that the basic principles of 
social order are set down, always in close relation to kinship 
regulations. A fall is necessary to set the wound-up clock of 
the cosmos into motion. What may we infer from all this? 
Jensen notes that a notion of God is always grounded in 
the disposition of the believer.11 Perhaps if one should medi- 
ate the ontological (life/death) and the sociological (we/they) 
elements he would arrive at a pretty accurate understanding of 
the nature and function of authority within the particular 
social system considered. Life and death within the social 
setting are controlled by the vested authority. The God model 
of a religious culture both reinforces and reflects the social 
model Within which it is situated. The Desana Page Abe him-
self initiates the fall in a relatively free and endogamous 
society. The crucial question to ask of Genesis 2-3 is: why 
did Yahweh allow the presence of such a dreadful tree or such 
a "subtle" creature? Perhaps the answer is that he is a suze-
rain, given to all the whims, arbitrariness, and authoritarian-
ism of the typical suzerain. Could it be that even in its 
most oppressed hours, the Hebrew mentality still favored an 
authoritarian social order such as obtained under the kings or 
the Maccabees? 
However, before structuralism and its ancillary methods 
can be accepted widely and without serious reservation, there 
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are a number of very serious operational problems which must 
be solved, several of which are mentioned by Lessa and Vogt.12 
The first, which we have already touched upon, is the problem 
of dividing a myth into its smallest complete units. This 
becomes a special problem in dealing with native languages. 
Are the shortest possible units in Zuni coincidental with the 
shortest possible units in English? At present, the most pro-
mising hope for resolving this problem is to be found in the 
researches of structural linguists such as Noam Chomsky. 
Briefly, Chomsky believes that genuine semiotic units of all 
sizes in all human languages can be described relationally by 
means of an algebra of recursive functions. Thus language 
formation in all human languages differ only in surface struc-
ture (specific combinations of phonemes, morphemic orders, et 
cetera). In fact, he believes that the ability to linguicize 
is due to an inherent organizational property of the central 
nervous system, shared by all men because all men have evolved 
along the same line. If his theory is correct, this would add 
profound support to the previously discussed thesis that Homo 
sapiens emerged in a single population rather than in several 
isolated ones. Indeed, Chomsky feels that were mankind to en-
counter equally intelligent beings from other star systems, 
only insights of the kind a true genius could produce would be 
able to crack the communications barrier, and subsequent com-
munication would probably have to be channelled through compu-
ters, since the organic systems for structuring communication 
within the kinds of intelligent beings, being products of 
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evolution under different conditions, would certainly be sup-
portive of efficient behavior under those different conditions, 
and would therefore likely generate markedly different modes 
of language formation describable by quite different mathema-
tical operations.13 
The second problem involves the question concerning whe-
ther two or more structural analysts working independently 
would be likely to arrange the smallest complete units of the 
myth in question (assuming these units are established for all 
concerned) in even closely similar, much less identical pat-
terns. This question is closely related to, and probably can 
not be answered independently of the third problem: how can 
an analyst move from the basic units to increasingly general 
themes? As of yet the structuralists have not demonstrated 
that they can generate their own hermeneutical criterion. 
They may never, because the situation the structuralists face 
is not too dissimilar to the circumstance which first con-
fronted mathematical logicians in 1931 when Kurt G5del demon-
strated conclusively that no logistic system sufficiently 
powerful to supply the foundations of basic arithmetical sys-
tems can, by its own logical operations, demonstrate its own 
consistency. As we have seen, Edmund Leach is constrained to 
rely on concepts borrowed from psychoanalytic theory, and to 
import wholesale the sociological conclusion that myths of the 
alchera refer to social relations. 
One might add (as many have) another objection specifi-
cally to the Leach attempt: it does not at all take cognizance 
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of the probability that Genesis 1 to 3 and following is a com-
pilation from different sources. However, Leach could note, 
with most exegetical authorities on Genesis, that in all prob-
ability the contributing sources themselves comprised complete 
creation accounts. He may assert, for example, that if the 
Yahwistic creation account (Genesis 2) is followed by the 
Yahwistic fall account (Genesis 3), and if the Priestly crea-
tion account (Genesis 1) can reasonably be linked, let us say, 
with the angelic fall of Genesis chapter six (apparently laun-
dered by the Genesis redactors, but dealt with at length in 
such pseudepigraphs as Jubilees and I Enoch), then he may as-
sert that the two sources are roughly parallel. Thereafter 
he would only have to cite the structuralist thesis that it is 
the redundancy of parallel structures, not the uniqueness of 
surface detail, which is important to establish the essential 
meaning of the accounts. In a similar manner, he does in fact 
assert, all four Gospel accounts have the very same meaning, 
in spite of flat contradiction in detail.14 However, it re-
mains to be seen that this approach does not in fact beg the 
question. 
CHAPTER VI 
REFLECTIONS 
Despite the many objections which might be raised against 
structuralism or any other attempt to discern an adequate 
naturalistic explanation of religion, it seems that the endea-
vors of such disciplines do appear to advance our knowledge 
somewhat; and not a few Christian scholars have thanked one 
approach or another for providing a key to important new theo-
logical insights. Yet it must be said that every advance made 
by any of the empirical disciplines necessarily strengthens 
the position of every philosophy which gives prominent empha-
sis to the empirical theory of knowledge. Nor can Christian 
theology effectively avoid their challenge by a retreat into 
outdated dogma. 
In a recent class presentation I referred to some pro-
blems concerning the usual statement that God rules the world 
by law, and concluded that we would perhaps do better to in-
terpret all law as theoretical or hypothetical constructs and 
turn instead to a view of Divine rule by orders of creation. 
At that time my primary concern was one of making our usual 
views of Divine regulation more intelligible in a contem-
porary non-theological setting. This, it seems to me, is 
essential if the modern Christian is to comprehend the depth 
and substance of his faith and not dichotomize his semantic 
and therefore intellectual life into two largely mutually 
44 
opaque and disjuncted segments, shifting into one for an 
hour's worship on Sunday and for scattered devotional per-
iods of a few minutes each during the week, and into the other 
for the remainder. It is also essential if he is to communi-
cate his faith intelligibly and coherently to, and defend it 
before a thoughtful secularist. But the order of creation 
approach has, it seems to me, an important implication; and 
it indicates an important problem. 
The implication is that God, as we know him, must be as-
sumed to govern the universe by what we've come to recognize 
as natural process, and that even his specific interventions 
are indirect and seemingly unobtrusive. It is conceivable 
that a metaphysical naturalist, especially one willing to 
entertain the possibility of parapsychological phenomena, 
could regard as true every empirical assertion the Bible makes 
and still find no reason to believe. The most spectacular 
miracles could be explained as the result of normal processes 
disrupted and dissipated by intervening processes which (who 
knows?) might be just as ordinary. 
To suggest a slight possibility, it is well-known that 
women under the age of twenty-one and above the age of thirty-
five are more likely to abort a fetus or bear a child with 
genetic abnormalities. Suppose that in the genesis of the 
ovum, at the point of nuclear division, one of the homologous 
X chromosomes undergoes only an incomplete disjunction so that 
by the second meiotic division the unfavored daughter cell of 
the first division would produce two polar bodies in which 
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process an incompletely disjoined lower right arm, as it were, 
of one X chromosome would break off and be taken with the other 
complete X chromosome into one polar body, leaving the other, 
in effect, with a Y (male) chromosome. Suppose that this body 
should somehow attach to, and be absorbed into, the new gamete 
from the favored daughter cell of the first division. Then a 
parthenogenesis would occur which would produce a male child. 
Thus Jesus' virgin birth could be explained as an extremely un-
likely, though completely natural process. 
And, of course, Leslie Weatherhead is almost notorious 
for attempting to produce suitably naturalistic explanations 
for the Resurrection and Ascension which would be plausible 
to the minds of today's cultured despisers. 
Certainly if the empirical assertions of the Bible are 
all true, then at the times the events they posit occurred, 
they would have been empirically explicable in principle. 
Our naturalistic friend may therefore only feel constrained to 
say that what the Bible asserts about God's nature and acti-
vity, being largely congruent with the empirical assertions, 
would seem worthy of acceptance because the facts are affec-
tively persuasive; however, they could not be rationally de-
monstrable. Which brings us to the problem: how can God 
(generally deemed a "Spirit") influence matter? 
To say that God is mind and that mind is not material 
but obviously influences matter (for example, in decision-
making) is inadequate. The rise of cybernetics and its 
application to computer technology, as well as the increasing 
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ability of computers to simulate human thought by autonomously 
gathering and interpreting information, employing stored infor-
mation, solving problems in a spectacular fashion, and even 
approaching human thought with analogues of creativity, fatigue, 
overload, and confusion begin to suggest that the concept of a 
special status for what is commonly regarded as mental activity 
is unwarranted. Further, electrochemical experiments upon the 
nervous systems of animals and men have indicated that minds 
may be changed by independent physical means. The discovery 
of such chemicals as phobophobin (a chemical first isolated in 
the nervous tissue of rats and which in significant quantity 
induces fear reactions) only adds to the ever-increasing evi-
dence that mind appears to have its basis in matter. The ex-
planation that mind is wholly immaterial energy lost its force 
when Einstein discovered that matter and energy are inter-
changeable states of the same "thing." Idealists have cited 
his discovery as supportive for their position, but it seems 
to support naturalistic ontologies as well. 
Even though behaviorism, central-state physicalism and 
the topic-neutral strategy have been hard-pressed to deal ade-
quately with such factors as introspective awareness and especi-
ally paranormal phenomena such as telepathy or clairvoyance, 
which fact renders metaphysical materialism as yet unproved, 
these factors may tentatively be described as emergent proper-
ties of special kinds of material complices.1  
Without further ado, it may nonetheless be pointed out 
that , however seriously we may have to regard the results of 
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methodological physicalism and methodological behaviorism, 
they will probably never be able to fully explain or control 
the natural.world. The logistic structure of our laws changes 
with every new scientific revolution. If there is a point 
beyond which it is impossible for man to observe (especially 
as Heisenberg has noted in his explanations of the principle 
of indeterminacy), then our best equations and most perfectly 
formulated laws are but approximations useful to a point. 
But if God is not mind, we have basically two other op-
tions. We may refer to him vaguely as Spirit and postulate 
that spirit is a kind of substance apart from the physical 
substance with which we presume to be acquainted, but can in-
fluence physical substance while yet remaining, of itself, 
totally unintelligible to the analytic efforts of entities 
constructed of physical substance. Or we can say that since 
God created the universe from nothing except that it was a 
kind of projection of Divine Word or Will; therefore we seem 
to be constrained to conclude that the universe is at base of 
the same substance as God himself since Divine Word or Will can 
hardly be of a substance different from that of God himself. 
John A. Wheeler, a Princeton Univertity cosmologist, 
theorizes that the basic level of the physical universe as we 
seem to know it is to be found on a scale of distances twenty 
powers of ten smaller than the scale of the nuclear structure 
of an atom. Were we able to view matters on this scale, 'we 
would see that pure space itself fluctuates at random like a 
foam. This assumption is necessitated by observations in the 
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field of quantum electrodynamics which demonstrated that the 
electromagnetic field, which transports electromagnetic radia-
tion across empty space, is always fluctuating; and by the in-
ference that the same is true for the gravitational field as 
well, corroborated by the observation of gravity waves by 
Joseph Weber of the University of Maryland. At this level, 
the physical aspects of space appear to be constantly in a 
"jiggle-jaggle fashion" emerging from and entering apparent 
nothingness. The ultimate physical level is the realm of 
complete indeterminacy. But Wheeler reasons further that the 
stage upon which the space of our universe deploys cannot be 
space itself: it must be situated in a larger arena. Since 
gravitational collapse draws the spatial features of very large 
areas into a small point, as is evidenced by the "black hole" 
phenomenon recently discovered by astronomers (and the existence 
of which was predicted by Wheeler himself), and since theorists 
predict that the universe itself will eventually have to under-
go a gravitational collapse, Wheeler theorizes that the stage 
of our four-dimensional universe is probably a hyperspace of 
infinite dimensions. Any single point in this "superspace" 
represents an entire three-dimensional universe at a moment. 
Nearby pointq are slightly different three-dimensional uni-
versal moments. The history of our universe appears as a track 
in this superspace, this realization of all possible worlds. 
Physical phenomena which seem to pass into nothingness are ac-
tually entering into a different universe.2 
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Wheeler's view is similar in some respects to Pierre 
Teilhard de Chardin's "theory of creative union." Defining 
matter and spirit "not as two separate things, as two natures, 
but as two directions of evolution within the world,"3 he 
theorizes that God willed to create spirit, that is, complete, 
conscious organic unity (the omega state) from a state of com-
plete and undifferentiated multiplicity (the ultimate of mat-
eriality) by a series of successive unifications of the multi-
ple into organic unities of higher and higher consciousness. 
Christ, then, appears in his system to be the universal ten-
dency of attraction and unification which reached a crucial 
point of inevitability in the life and resurrection of Jesus 
of Nazareth. Unitive persons who die in faith individually 
are metamorphosed into the being of God, as will occur in the 
omega state when humanity will be forced to make a unitive de-
cision of the then single cosmic consciousness to accept God 
or reject him. Then the unitive portion will immediately be 
translated into the dimension of union with God, while the in-
dividuals objecting will find themselves in a hell of multi-
plicity increasing toward nothingness. 
I am not clear about whether to call Teilhard a pantheist 
or not. He claims that what differentiates pantheism from his 
doctrine of "pan-Christism" is the tendency of adherents to the 
former to set the universal center helots; the level of con-
sciousness rather than above it, as its apex and guide. Fur-
ther, it is not clear whether absolute multiplicity is no-
thingness or what approaches it. If it is the former, the 
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universe is a creation out of being, if you will, which is a 
part of God. If it is the latter, Teilhard may be read as 
upholding a doctrine that matter is coeternal and coexistent 
with God. In either case, the action of God is seen as a 
definite part of physical process.4 
There are many points which must be explicated in the 
system of Teilhard. It contains many apparent contradictions, 
at times seems almost deliberately obscure, contains scienti- 
fic mistakes, and almost completely disregards Scripture. But 
his striking proximity to some of the views I have cited and 
his definite attempts to utilize scientific concepts in an 
apologetic way suggest that his work is worthy of careful con-
sideration by the Christian who feels severely the pressure to 
renounce God imposed upon him by metaphysical naturalists. 
CHAPTER VII 
CONCLUSION 
In this paper we have noted some interesting data from 
the study of the phenomenology of religions which parallel in 
certain ways various aspects of Christian belief. We have 
then noted and evaluated somewhat some important attempts of 
psychoanalysts and sociologists to interpret the nature of 
religious belief. We then dealt at some length with struc-
turalism, its promise, and its problems. In spite of the 
advance of methodological naturalism, I ultimately suggest 
that this development does not necessarily portend the nec-
essary abandonment of the Christian faith. Christians will 
need to be flexible and adaptable in their confrontation 
with the challenges posed herein, but the core of our faith 
need not be abandoned. 
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